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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the LIBOR rigging scandal broke into the public consciousness in mid-
2012, every day’s news seems to bring with it reports of new litigation and 
regulatory actions.  The effects of the debacle will likely play out in courts around 
the world for years.   
The goal of this article is to present the reader with a general overview of the 
LIBOR: its genesis and development, how and why London bankers manipulated 
the LIBOR, the liability of implicated parties, criminal penalties, the impact of 
criminal penalties on director and officer insurance carriers, and what the future 
holds for the LIBOR.   
II. THE LONDON INTERBANK OFFERED RATE (THE LIBOR)  
The LIBOR developed in response to “rising demand around the 1960s for 
‘Euro’ currencies—offshore, stateless, and often in dollars—that swept London 
and allowed companies and countries to borrow, deposit and repay while dodging 
domestic regulation and taxes.”.”1   
                                                            
* Michael R. Koblenz’s practice areas include Litigation and general corporate law; commodities, 
securities, antitrust, administrative proceedings, arbitrations, director’s and officer’s liability cases, real 
estate, entertainment law, and regulatory matters. The practice includes hedge funds, mergers, 
acquisitions, and private and public offerings. Mr. Koblenz has represented commodities futures 
exchanges, clearing organizations, and broker/dealers as well as individual traders and brokers, and 
advice on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Having served as a federal prosecutor with the United 
States Department of Justice, Mr. Koblenz also engages in the defense of white-collar criminal cases 
involving securities, commodities, antitrust, telemarketing, and postal fraud. 
Mr. Koblenz has defended a number of class action lawsuits over the years; including but not limited to 
class actions brought against New York Commodities Exchanges, brokers and precious metals 
companies. He is currently defending a class action suit in California with co-counsel. Mr. Koblenz is a 
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Geopolitical forces, especially the Vietnam War, coincided with the emergence of 
global trade imbalances and restrictive legislation in the U.S. and resulted in the 
unexpected and sudden creation of the Eurodollar market in London in the 
1960s . . . .  It was from this start that syndicated lending and capital markets 
recycled offshore dollars using floating interest rates based on [the] L[IBOR].2   
 At the time, no uniform index for determining the true interbank or reference 
rate existed.3  
For each [syndicated] loan, then, reference banks that were deemed representative 
of a cross section of the syndicate—or, for more neutrality, banks outside the 
syndicate—were chosen by the parties. The rates at which these reference banks 
could borrow would be aggregated to form the ‘interbank rate’ for the purpose of 
the loan.4   
However, “[t]his method was cumbersome, and offered multiple 
opportunities for manipulation.  This was especially true in London, where an 
older banking culture of gentlemanly capitalism prevailed, and where favors and 
family connections were still central to a bank’s success.”5   
Many overseas banks had offices in London, which quickly became the 
home of the loosely regulated European currencies. A handful of enterprising 
London bankers organized several London banks “into consortia, sharing the risks 
for massive syndicated loans funded through a series of short-term deposits based 
on floating interest rates.” 6 
Minos Zombanakis, who ran the London branch of Manufacturers Hanover, 
created the formula that would become the LIBOR.  Within each syndicate, a 
group of “big reference banks . . . would report their funding costs shortly before a 
loan rollover date.  The weighted average, rounded to the nearest 1/8th percent 
plus a ‘spread’ for profit, became the price of the loan for the next period.”7 
However,  
                                                            
Registered Legal Practitioner in the DIFC Courts (Dubia). 
* Kenneth M. Labbate is a partner in the New York office of Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass. He 
concentrates his practice in the defense of professional liability claims and has successfully defended 
various professionals including directors and officers, accountants, attorneys, insurance agents and 
brokers, real estate agents, brokers, appraisers and other miscellaneous professionals. 
* Carrie Turner is an associate in the New York City office of Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass. 
Prior to joining Mound Cotton, Ms. Turner clerked for one year for the Honorable Boyce F. Martin, Jr. 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. She received her J.D. from Boston 
University School of Law where she was the Editor-in-Chief of the Boston University School of Law 
Public Interest Law Journal. 
1 Kirstin Ridley & Huw Jones, Insight: A Greek Banker, the Shah and the Birth of Libor, REUTERS 
(Aug. 7, 2012, 9:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/08/us-banking-libor-change-
idUSBRE87702320120808. 
2 Ridley & Jones, supra note 1.  
3 Sean Vanatta, Libor’s Risks Emerged from Clubby London Banking Culture, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 
14, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/libor-s-risks-emerged-from-clubby-
london-banking-culture.html.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Ridley & Jones, supra note 1. 
7 Vanatta, supra note 3. 
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[t]he use of the interbank rate shifted interest-rate risks to borrowers, and in the 
turbulent climate of the late 1970s financial institutions developed new tools to 
offset these risks. The most important of these was the interest-rate swap, a form of 
derivatives contract that allowed a party to hedge differences in short- and long-
term interest rates.8   
The many possible interest rates “made the development of a transparent 
market difficult, because each swap contract might have different terms and be 
linked to different reference banks.  Nonuniformity was a significant problem in a 
market already estimated to be worth several trillion dollars in the mid-1980s.”9  
“The rise of the derivatives market generally, and interest-rate swaps in particular, 
thus created the need for a more systematic index.”10 
Furthermore, London banks were still somewhat skeptical about investing in 
the new instruments due to the necessity of bartering an underlying rate prior to 
entering into the new contracts.11  The banks turned to the British Bankers’ 
Association (“BBA”), an industry trade association whose main job is to lobby on 
banks’ behalf and represent the banking industry.12  The banks requested that the 
BBA devise a benchmark to act as a reference point for the new instruments.13  
The rate was intended to “facilitate[] the operation of markets, and ma[k]e 
benchmarking more transparent and objective.”14 
In October 1984 the BBA—working with other parties such as the Bank of 
England—established various working parties, which eventually culminated in the 
production of the BBAIRS terms, the BBA standard for Interest Swap rates.15  
From 1986 until 1998, banks submitted their rate quotes daily to the BBA LIBOR 
process by answering the question, “[a]t what rate do you think interbank term 
deposits will be offered by one prime bank to another prime bank for a reasonable 
market size today at 11 am [London time]?”16  In 1998, the Foreign Exchange and 
Money Markets Committee,17 an independent committee of market participants 
                                                            
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Historical Perspective, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/historical-
perspective (last visited on Mar. 29, 2013). 
12 David Enrich & Max Colchester, Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of Libor, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443847404577631404235329424.html.  According to 
the BBA’s website, as of July, 2012, the Foreign Exchange and Money Markets Committee had “sole 
responsibility for all aspects of the functioning and development of [BBA LIBOR].”  Landon Thomas, 
Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/business/global/the-gentlemens-club-that-sets-libor-is-called-into-
question.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.  That committee is composed largely of bankers and financial 
professionals.  Id.  The chairman of this committee is a representative from a panel of banks including 
some of the world’s biggest institutions like Barclays, Citigroup, and UBS.  Id.  This committee 
submitted the rates that become the LIBOR average.  Id.   
13 Historical Perspective, supra note 11. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Liam Vaughan, Secret Libor Committee Clings to Anonymity Following Scandal, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/secret-libor-committee-clings-to-
anonymity-after-rigging-scandal.html.  The identities of the members of this committee, representatives 
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that oversees the LIBOR, decided that “a universal definition of a prime bank 
could no longer be given,” and that banks needed to link the figures that they 
reported to their own market activity, “rather than [to] a hypothetical entity.”18  
Banks were required, in submitting rates, to answer the question “at what rate 
could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-
bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 a[.]m.[]?”19  “[The BBA] 
has overseen the process ever since, even as the club of gentlemen bankers making 
syndicated loans in the City of London evolved into the opaque and impersonal 
multitrillion-dollar interbank market.”20   
The LIBOR has become integrated into a majority of the world’s financial 
products,21 and currently provides the reference point for nearly all interest rate 
derivatives and variable rate loans available in the financial markets.22  It is 
currently calculated for fifteen different loan durations, ranging from overnight to a 
year, and in ten currencies, including the pound, the dollar, the euro, and the 
Swedish krona.23  The LIBOR rates “[are] used as a benchmark to set payments on 
about $800 trillion-worth of financial instruments, ranging from complex interest-
rate derivatives to simple mortgages.  The number determines the global flow of 
billions of dollars each year.”24  The rates signal a bank’s health to financial 
markets, rising when banks are in trouble, and create the basis for payments on 
trillions of dollars in corporate debt, home mortgages, and financial contracts 
world-wide.25  Moreover, the impact of even small rate shifts can be critical.  “A 
small increase in [the] LIBOR can make a big difference for borrowers.  For 
example, an extra 0.3 percentage points would add about $100 to the monthly 
payment on a $500,000, adjustable-rate mortgage, or $300,000 in annual interest 
costs for a company with $100 million in floating-rate debt.”26  Because of its 
pervasiveness in, and significance for, the financial markets, the rate has come to 
be known as “the world’s most important number.”27   
Currently, member banks28 report their LIBOR29 submissions each morning 
                                                            
from the world’s largest banks, are not public knowledge.  Id.  In the past, the committee met in London 
at an undisclosed location every two months to review the LIBOR rate.  Id. 
18 See Historical Perspective, supra note 11. 
19 Id. 
20 Thomas, Jr., supra note 12. 
21 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12. 
22 The Rotten Heart of Finance: The LIBOR Scandal, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558281 [hereinafter The Rotten Heart of Finance]; see also FIN. 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 56, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/2012report/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
23 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINAL NOTICE TO BANK 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclays-jun12.pdf 
24 The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 22. 
25 Carrick Mollenkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120831164167818299.html. 
26 Id. 
27 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12.  According to Enrich and Colchester, this description of the 
LIBOR has popped up repeatedly in lawsuits regarding the rate’s alleged manipulation.  Id. 
28 The BBA represents over 200 banks.  Member List, BBA, http://www.bba.org.uk/about-
us/member-list (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (including a list of members). 
29 Other rates include the EURIBOR, TIBOR and STIBOR, The European Union, Tokyo and 
Singapore’s benchmark rates.   
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to the BBA and European Banking Federation (“EBF”), respectively.  The BBA 
and EBF require that reporting banks use their subjective judgments in determining 
the submitted rates30; therefore, the accuracy of the LIBOR and EURIBOR, as a 
measure of interest rates, relies upon the accuracy of the subjective judgment of the 
individual reporting banks.31  Derivatives traders are strictly prohibited from 
considering their own financial positions in exercising their subjective judgment.32  
Thomson Reuters, on behalf of the BBA and EBF, then collates the submissions, 
calculates the final benchmark rates,33 and publishes the daily rates.   
III. “THIS IS THE WAY YOU PULL OFF DEALS LIKE THIS”34  
According to the United States Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”)35 and the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”),36 
two regulatory bodies charged with investigating alleged market manipulation, as 
early as 2005 evidence surfaced that the major global financial and banking 
services company, Barclays Bank PLC (“Barclays”), was falsifying its reported 
EURIBOR rates, and, to a lesser extent, its LIBOR rates, at the request of its own 
derivatives traders and other banks.37 
“[I]nterest rate swap traders . . . regularly requested that . . . Barclays’ 
employee(s) responsible for determining and [setting] Barclays’ daily LIBOR and 
EURIBOR [rates]” adjust the rates or submit specific rates in order to alter the 
daily published LIBOR or EURIBOR.38  Barclays’ traders also “coordinated with 
                                                            
30 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 6. 
31 See id. at 22–23. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 7.  The highest and lowest rates are excluded in determining the final benchmark rates.  Id. 
34 This is a comment made by one trader to another via instant message on March 19, 2007, after 
the final benchmark EURIBOR rates were published, indicating that the traders involved considered 
their strategy to manipulate the EURIBOR successful.  FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 22.  In 
another broadly publicized exchange, a Barclays’ derivatives trader told a trader from another bank with 
regard to a three-month dollar LIBOR, “duuuude . . . what’s up with ur guys 34.5 3m fix . . . tell him to 
get it up.”  Id. at 20.  Other traders made statements such as “We have an unbelievably large set on 
Monday (the IMM).  We need a really low 3m fix, it could potentially cost a fortune.  Would really 
appreciate any help.”  Id.  at 12.  “Noonish?  Whos going to put my low fixings in?  hehehe.”  Id.  These 
are only a few of the many communications that reveal a long practice of rate-rigging among traders.  
See also, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to 
Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and Imposing 
Remedial Sanctions, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/ 
enfbarclaysorder062712.pdf. 
35 The FSOC, established under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, monitors the stability of the United States’ financial system.  Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/default.aspx 
(last updated Oct. 22, 2012).  The FSOC “is charged with identifying [threats] to the financial stability 
of the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerging risks to the stability of 
the United States’ financial system.”  Id. 
36 “The [FSA] is an independent non-governmental body [in the United Kingdom] given statutory 
powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.”  Who Are We?, FIN. SERVICES AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who (last updated May 17, 2012).  The FSA is “accountable to Treasury 
Ministers and, through them, [to] Parliament.”  Id.  The FSA’s job is to “provide full information for 
firms, consumers and others about our objectives, plans, policies and rules. . . .”  Id. 
37 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 2. 
38 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 2–3. 
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traders at other banks” “in attempts to manipulate [rates].”39  “Between January 
2005 and June 2009, Barclays derivatives traders made a total of 257 requests to 
fix L[IBOR] and E[URIBOR] rates . . . .”40  
In September 2007, depositors made a run on Northern Rock, a bank in the 
United Kingdom, making Northern Rock the first “casualty” in what became the 
global financial crisis of 2007–08.41  Media news-sources worldwide speculated 
whether banks had adequate liquidity, focusing on the LIBOR and EURIBOR as 
the measurement of a bank’s ability to borrow funds.42  Media sources identified 
Barclays as having especially high LIBOR submissions at the beginning of the 
crisis, prompting market speculation that Barclays was at risk.43  In an effort to 
deflect negative media attention, Barclays’ senior treasury managers instructed 
their subordinates to reduce Barclays’ LIBOR submissions, coining a phrase “head 
above the parapet” to describe Barclays’ practice of altering the LIBOR to bring it 
relatively close to submissions by other banks.44  Between September 2007 and 
May 2009, Barclays continued to manipulate its LIBOR submissions in an attempt 
to make Barclays look healthier and increase Barclays’ ability to raise funds.45   
By 2007, Barclays’ scheme had begun to unravel.  In November 2007, 
various Barclays’ compliance officers contacted the FSA to express concern about 
the rates set by both Barclays and other banks.46  By 2008, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (“New York Fed”) also received calls, including a call from a 
banking insider who told the Fed that, “I think the problem is that the market so 
desperately wants [the] libors down it’s actually putting wrong rates in.”47  In April 
2008, when a New York Fed official questioned a Barclays’ employee about its 
reported rates, the employee admitted that Barclays had been manipulating rates in 
order to avoid the stigma of reporting rates either higher or lower than other 
reporting banks.48  On April 16, 2008, the Wall Street Journal published an article 
that opened, “[o]ne of the most important barometers of the world’s financial 
health could be sending false signals . . . . The growing suspicions about 
L[IBOR]’s veracity suggest that banks’ troubles could be worse than they’re 
willing to admit.”49   
According to a Bank of England memorandum, the BBA responded to the 
Wall Street Journal article “by sending a memo to banks reminding them to 
                                                            
39 Id. 
40 Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013, 6:15 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671255; see FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 11. 
41 See The Bank That Failed, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/9832838. 
42 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 3. 
43 Mark Gilbert, Barclays Takes a Money Market Beating, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2007), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8uEKKBYY7As. 
44 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 20. 
45 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 3. 
46 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 21–22. 
47 Transcript of Phone Call between Barclays Employee and Analyst in the Markets Group of the 
New York Fed (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/ 
2012/libor/October_24_2008_transcript.pdf. 
48 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 22. 
49 Mollenkamp, supra note 25. 
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‘submit honest rates’” and launching what BBA executives referred to as a “charm 
offensive” for the benefit of its investors and journalists.50  Other members of the 
BBA suggested that the BBA should no longer be responsible for the LIBOR.51  At 
an April 25, 2008 meeting with officials at the Bank of England, Angela Knight, 
Chief Executive Officer of the BBA, argued that the LIBOR “had become too big 
for her organization to manage.”52  Despite Ms. Knight’s concerns, regulators 
resisted taking a greater role in overseeing the LIBOR.53  BBA member banks also 
resisted ceding control, BBA executives arguing with one another whether they 
should continue the “lucrative business” of managing the LIBOR.54  In mid-May 
of 2008, the BBA held a meeting of the Foreign Exchange & Money Markets 
Committee, a panel charged with making decisions about the LIBOR, in which 
BBA officials agreed to deal with banks with artificially low LIBOR data, by “just 
picking up the phone . . . and hav[ing] a conversation behind closed doors.”55   
By May of 2008, the New York Fed had briefed United States Treasury 
Department senior officials regarding the suspected rate manipulation.56  In early 
June of 2008, Timothy Geithner, then-head of the New York Fed, sent the Bank of 
England’s governor, Sir Mervyn King, a list of recommendations regarding how to 
tackle the LIBOR’s credibility issue.57  Ms. Knight, upon learning of Mr. 
Geithner’s proposals, emailed a top Bank of England official, Paul Tucker, 
informing him of the proposals and urging Mr. Tucker to join the New York Fed in 
developing oversight panels.58  Mr. Tucker declined.59  
Throughout the following months, regulators investigated Barclays’ 
submissions in an attempt to address the LIBOR credibility issues.60  Barclays 
continued to deny that it had falsified rate submissions.  When the BBA issued a 
draft document to banks in November of 2008 regarding procedures for setting the 
LIBOR rates, and requiring audits of all submissions, Barclays refused to adapt its 
procedures.61  As late as November 2009, Barclays had no specific system or 
controls in place relating to its LIBOR and EURIBOR submission process.62  
When BBA staffers pitched a plan to clean up the LIBOR to industry executives, 
                                                            
50 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12. 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 See New York Fed Responds to Congressional Request for Information on Barclays – LIBOR 
Matter, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (July 13, 2012), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/ 
news/markets/2012/Barclays_LIBOR_Matter.html; see also, Samuel Chen & Matt Raskin, Recent 
Concerns Regarding LIBOR’s Credibility, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (May 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/libor/MarketSource_ 
Report_May202008.pdf.  
57 Cheyenne Hopkins & Caroline Salas Gage, Geithner Sent BOE’s King Libor Revamp 
Recommendations in 2008, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012, 6:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-07-13/geithner-proposed-libor-changes-in-2008-memo-to-bank-of-england.html. 
58 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12. 
59 Id.  The New York Fed later decided not to assist in cleaning up the LIBOR.  Id. 
60 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 22–25. 
61 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 32–35.  
62 Id.  
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staffers reported getting the impression that the banks, which paid most of the 
BBA’s costs, wanted the LIBOR kept in-house where they could influence it.63  
Consequently, the BBA’s plan was shelved.64 
By the spring of 2012, United States’ and the United Kingdom’s 
investigators had uncovered substantial evidence that Barclays and several other 
unnamed banks65 had tried to manipulate the LIBOR.66  In June 2012, following an 
extensive investigation, Barclays finally admitted to misconduct.67  The FSA 
imposed a £59.5 million ($92.8 million) penalty on Barclays.68  On June 27, 2012, 
Barclays agreed to pay a $360 million fine to settle charges brought against it by 
the United States Department of Justice and the United States Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”).69  On July 2, 2012, Barclays’ chairman, Marcus 
Agius, Chief Executive Officer, Robert Diamond, and Chief Operating Officer, 
Jerry del Missier, resigned amid allegations of misconduct.70   
IV. THE GATHERING STORM71 
A.  Legal Actions and Government Investigations 
In July 2012, the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office72 launched a 
criminal investigation into the LIBOR scandal, investigating a total of eighteen 
banks including Citigroup, Inc., Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, UBS AG, 
                                                            
63 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12. 
64 Id. 
65 The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 22. 
66 Id. 
67 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions 
for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 
Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.  
68 Jill Treanor, Barclays Fined £290m as Bid to Manipulate Interest is Exposed, GUARDIAN, (June 
27, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jun/27/barclays-chief-bob-diamond-bonus-fine. 
69 Jenna Greene & Jan Wolfe, Barclays Agrees to Pay $360 Million for Manipulating Interest 
Rates, N.Y. L. J. (June 29, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202561164644&Barclays_Agrees_to_Pay_360_Million_for_Manipulating_Interest_Rates&slreturn=2
0120715013406.  
70 Halah Touryalai, Libor Cleanup: Barclays Names David Walker New Chairman, FORBES (Aug. 
9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/08/09/libor-cleanup-work-barclays-names-
david-walker-new-chairman.  According to David Enrich and Dana Cimilluca, Barclays found notes of 
a phone call between senior Bank of England official, Paul Tucker, and Barclays’ Robert Diamond.  
David Enrich & Dana Cimilluca, Missteps Doomed Barclays’ Leaders, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303612804577528852646272314.html.  “According 
to Mr. Diamond’s notes of the call . . . Mr. Tucker told Mr. Diamond that, ‘it did not always need to be 
the case that [Barclays] appeared as high as [it has] recently.”  Id.  “Mr. Diamond passed the notes 
along to [Jerry] del Missier” who, according to Barclays, “interpreted the . . . conversation as . . .  
instruction[s] to understate the bank’s LIBOR submissions” and, according to Barclays “told deputies to 
do just that.”  Id.  “Mr. Tucker has denied that this was his intended message.”  Id; Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, Robert Diamond’s Next Life, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/magazine/robert-diamonds-next-life.html?pagewanted=all. 
71 The Gathering Storm is the title of Winston Churchill’s first volume in his six-volume history of 
World War II.  
72 Jill Treanor, Serious Fraud Office Close to Criminal Charges over Libor Rigging Scandal, 
GUARDIAN (July 30, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/30/serious-fraud-office-libor-
rigging. 
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ICAP PLC, Lloyds Banking Group PLC, and Deutsche Bank AG.73  The CFTC 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States simultaneously 
conducted civil probes into banking activity regarding the LIBOR rigging.74 
In June 2012, Barclays reached a settlement with investigators, and paid 
more than $450 million in fines.75  In December 2012, UBS was fined $1.5 billion 
for LIBOR rigging.76  It was fined an additional $14.5 million by Britian’s 
financial regulators for exposing customers to unacceptable risk when UBS sold an 
AIG investment fund to customers.77  The Royal Bank of Scotland was fined $610 
million by US and UK authorities in February 2013.78  European Union regulators 
continue to investigate other banks involved in the scandal, including Citigroup, 
reportedly J.P. Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank, and various other European 
lenders.79  The United States Department of Justice has already brought criminal 
charges against several individual traders and may bring more.80 
Until March 29, 2013, it appeared that litigation arising out of the LIBOR 
scandal “ha[d] the potential to be the biggest single set of cases coming out of the 
financial crisis.”81  According to Advisen Ltd., a company that researches and 
analyzes underwriting, marketing, and buying commercial insurance, as of 
September 28, 2012, there were eighty-eight actions filed against twenty banks, 
including sixty-eight lawsuits and twenty regulatory investigations,82 related to the 
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LAW (Apr. 9, 2013 9:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-09/eu-said-to-push-to-fine-
banks-over-yen-libor-and-euribor-rates.html. 
80 Lindsay Fortado, Phil Mattingly, & Silla Brush, UBS Libor Traders Face U.S. Criminal 
Charges, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-12-19/ubs-
libor-fine-soars-as-traders-bribed-brokers-to-fix-libor-rate#p1. 
81 Roben Farzad, Libor, The New Asbestos, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-01/libor-the-new-asbestos. 
82 Susanne Sclafane, 88 & Counting: Pension Fund Suits Next for Libor?, ADVISEN FRONT PAGE 
NEWS, (Sept. 27, 2012), http://fpn.advisen.com/articles/article1853247321165010714.html.  According 
to Advisen this includes: eleven claims or investigations against Barclays; nine claims or investigations 
against Citibank; eight claims or investigations against JP Morgan Chase Bank; seven claims or 
investigations each against Bank of America; Royal Bank of Scotland Group, UBS; six claims or 
investigations each against Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC; four claims or 
investigations against Lloyds Banking Group; three claims or investigations each against Westdeutsche 
Landesbank and Norinchukin Bank; two claims or investigations each against Bank of Tokyo 
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LIBOR scandal.83  Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald, federal district judge for the 
Southern District of New York, consolidated the numerous antitrust suits filed 
against the LIBOR-rigging banks into one multi-district lawsuit. 
Within that action, Judge Reice Buchwald divided the cases into four 
categories of suits: cases brought by (1) over-the-counter (“OTC”) plaintiffs, (2) 
exchange-based plaintiffs, (3) bondholder plaintiffs, and (4) Charles Schwab 
plaintiffs.84  The first three categories of cases involved class action suits, each 
with a single lead case.85  The Schwab plaintiffs did not purport to represent a class 
and initiated three separate cases within the MDL.86   
The OTC plaintiffs had purchased interest rate swaps directly from 
defendants in which the rate of return was tied to the LIBOR.87  The exchange-
based plaintiffs were various companies that traded futures contracts based on 
Eurodollar futures and options on exchanges that were allegedly harmed by the 
LIBOR manipulation.88  Bondholder plaintiffs owned LIBOR-based bonds for 
which they received allegedly artificially depressed amounts of interest during the 
class period.89  The Schwab plaintiffs alleged injuries based on the purchase and/or 
holding of LIBOR-based securities during the class period.90  
Additional plaintiffs continue to file complaints.  The Court, noting that 
“information relating to this case [will] continue indefinitely to come to light,”91 on 
August 14, 2012 imposed a stay on all complaints not then subject to the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss then before the Court.92 
On March 29, 2013, the Court issued an Order on the motions to dismiss.  
The Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss federal antitrust and RICO 
action claims, granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs’ commodities 
manipulation claims, and dismissed with prejudice the Schwab plaintiffs 
Cartwright Act claim and exchange-based plaintiffs’ state-law claims.  The Court 
also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law 
claims.93   
The Court’s decision to dismiss the antitrust claims brought under the 
Sherman Act is significant because the Court, in essence, dismissed claims brought 
by three of the four plaintiff groups: holders of LIBOR linked bonds, mutual funds, 
                                                            
83 Id.  This calculation represented the eighty-eight different combinations of lawsuits, 
investigations, and banks, not eighty-eight separate actions.  Id. 
84 In re: LIBOR-based Financial Instruments Anti-Trust Litigation, No. 1:13-cv-01016-NRB 
(S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ 
libor032913.pdf (Judge Buchwald’s memorandum and order dismissing the various plaintiffs' federal 
antitrust claim, RICO claim, and state-law claims, but finding that the exchange-based plaintiffs had 
adequately pleaded the CEA cause of action for manipulation of Eurodollar futures).   
85 Id. 
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87 Id. at 15. 
88 Id. at 19–20. 
89 Id. at 16–17. 
90 Id. at 21–23. 
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93 Id. at 3–4.   
2013 LIBOR 291 
 
and over-the-counter securities.94  The Court explained that, in order to recover on 
such a claim, a plaintiff must show that its losses stemmed from a defendant’s 
anticompetitive conduct.95  The Court reasoned that, although the plaintiffs’ 
allegations “might suggest that defendants fixed prices and thereby harmed 
plaintiffs . . . the process of setting the LIBOR was never intended to be 
competitive.  Rather, it was a cooperative endeavor . . . .”96  The Court further 
clarified that, “it is not sufficient that plaintiffs paid higher prices because of 
defendants’ collusion; that collusion must have been anticompetitive . . . the 
alleged collusion occurred in an area in which defendants never did and never were 
intended to compete.”97 
The Court’s decision leaves only plaintiffs that traded LIBOR-linked 
contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that brought claims for violation of 
the Commodities Exchange Act.  The Court held that defendants, by manipulating 
the price of the LIBOR, which was incorporated into the price of Eurodollar 
futures contracts, manipulated the price of contracts traded on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, thus violating the Commodities Exchange Act.98  The Court 
dismissed many of the commodities violation claims, however, finding that the 
plaintiffs had failed to bring claims within the statute of limitations.99 The Court 
acknowledged that: 
[I]t might be unexpected that we are dismissing a substantial portion of plaintiffs’ 
claims, given that several of the defendants here have already paid penalities to 
government regulatory agencies reaching into the billions of dollars.  However, 
these results are not as incongruous as they might seem.  Under the statutes invoked 
here, there are many requirements that private plaintiffs must satisfy, but which 
government agencies need not.  The reason for these differing requirements is that 
the focuses of public enforcement and private enforcement, even of the same 
statutes, are not identical.  The broad public interests behind the statutes invoked 
here, such as integrity of the markets and competition, are being addressed by 
ongoing governmental enforcement.  While public enforcement is often 
supplemented by suits brought by private parties acting as ‘private attorneys 
general,’ those private actions which seek damages and attorney’s fees must be 
examined closely to ensure that the plaintiffs who are suing are the ones properly 
entitled to recover and that the suit is, in fact, serving the public purposes of the law 
being invoked.100   
As a result of this ruling, only a portion of the claimants that asserted 
commodities violations remain.  Plaintiffs whose state law claims were dismissed 
without prejudice may attempt to pursue those claims in state court.  Plaintiffs 
whose antitrust claims were dismissed must next decide whether or not to appeal 
the district court’s decision to the Second Circuit. 
                                                            
94 Law of the Lend, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
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95 In re: LIBOR-based Financial Instruments Anti-Trust Litigation, No. 1:13-cv-01016-NRB at 27.   
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If the 2nd Circuit upholds Buchwald, the Libor litigation may end up resembling 
securities litigation over mortgage-backed securities. After federal courts narrowed 
the standing of lead plaintiffs, MBS class actions ended up being much smaller than 
investors’ lawyers originally expected. The 2nd Circuit subsequently expanded 
standing for lead plaintiffs in MBS class actions, but in the meantime individual 
investors in mortgage-backed notes, including German banks that held tens of 
billions of dollars of MBS, brought their own suits in state and federal courts. 
We’re still waiting to see how profitable those cases turn out to be.101 
It is unclear what impact the Court’s ruling will have on LIBOR claims 
pending in other courts, such as the case brought by Freddie Mac in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against banks that 
allegedly manipulated the LIBOR and the British Bankers Association.102  It is 
also unclear whether this case will be transferred to the Southern District of New 
York as part of the multi-district-litigation or whether, because Freddie Mac has 
alleged distinctive breach of contract actions against the defendant banks, it will be 
permitted to remain in Virginia on the “rocket docket.”103  What is clear is that the 
Court’s opinion will affect future LIBOR litigation, especially where plaintiffs 
intend to allege or have already alleged antitrust claims.  Moreover, the Court’s 
opinion must come as a relief to banks concerned that entering into regulatory 
settlements could damage them in private antitrust litigation where they would be 
subject to triple damages.104   
B.  Director and Officer Liability105 
As ongoing regulatory investigations seem likely to lead to individual 
criminal charges, there is a question as to whether the LIBOR scandal may impact 
director and officer (“D&O”) liability insurance premiums.  Already, several 
directors and officers suspected of playing a part in the scandal have either 
resigned or been fired.106  Banks are setting aside monetary reserves for potential 
claims.107   
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A carrier’s exposure for a bank’s D&O actions will depend upon what type 
of suit is filed against the bank: whether the claims filed are for antitrust violations, 
shareholder derivative suits, securities class actions, or fraud.108  However, for 
now, members of the D&O insurance community do not agree on what the 
potential impact on insurers and the future of D&O liability will likely be.  The 
regulatory fines and penalties are not likely to be covered under existing D&O 
insurance policies.109  However, Catherine Thomas, director of analytics of A.M. 
Best Europe Rating Services, Ltd., stated that if the LIBOR manipulation causes 
customers to suffer losses, “then there is the potential for D&O and [professional 
indemnity] claims.”110  Ms. Thomas stated that, “[o]n the [personal injury] side, 
claims could come because customers are filing lawsuits because they believe 
they’ve been mis-sold products that were linked to the LIBOR rate.”111  While 
warning that it is too early to predict the outcome on D&O premiums, Ms. Thomas 
stated that the scandal could result in upward pressure on rates, and that brokers 
and underwriters will be vigilant regarding policy wording when they renegotiate 
policies in the future.112   
Although plaintiffs have filed multiple antitrust suits against various banks 
involved in LIBOR manipulation, D&O carriers have experienced little exposure 
thus far.113  
The only defendants named so far in the antitrust lawsuits are corporate entities and 
no individuals have been named as defendants . . . .  Individuals would have 
coverage if they were named in antitrust lawsuits, but there is no entity coverage 
under a public company D&O policy for antitrust claims. The antitrust claims by 
far are the biggest potential exposure for the company, but not for their insurance 
carriers.114 
Shareholders have filed derivative lawsuits against Citibank and Bank of 
America on behalf of corporations.115  These suits allege that the banks failed to 
take appropriate steps to protect the bank and its shareholders from LIBOR 
manipulation.116  Although shareholder derivative suits can expose defendant 
corporations and their carriers to serious financial consequences, since only three 
of the banks embroiled in the LIBOR scandal are domiciled in the United States— 
Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase—the overall exposure for these 
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banks’ carriers may be limited.117 
 Exposure for D&O carriers will likely arise from damages for securities 
class-action lawsuits, although in light of Judge Reice Buchwald’s recent Order, it 
remains unclear whether class-action suits will have much traction.118  Barclays, 
Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank each trade securities on United States securities 
exchanges and, theoretically, their carriers could face exposure.119  However, given 
that the insurance industry cut back on insuring large banks prior to the financial 
crisis,120 and Judge Buchwald’s recent ruling, exposure for D&O carriers seems 
less likely.  In light of these variables, D&O insurers may come out of the LIBOR 
imbroglio largely unscathed.121 
V.  THE FUTURE OF THE LIBOR 
The United Kingdom has responded to the scandal by creating a new 
Financial Services Bill that will overhaul regulation of the United Kingdom’s 
financial sector, a new Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”)122 to oversee 
financial services and markets in the United Kingdom, and new regulatory 
authorities.123  The old FSA has been abolished124 and has been replaced by the 
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority125 and the new FCA.126  Martin 
Wheatley, the managing director of the FSA and Chief Executive Officer-
designate of the new FCA, which is tasked with regulating financial services firms 
delivering products to consumers, established an independent review of the 
LIBOR, and generated a report of his findings.127   
Mr. Wheatley officially unveiled the United Kingdom government’s plan to 
overhaul the LIBOR rate in his report, The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final 
Report, in September 2012.128  The report recommends a “substantial package of 
reforms” the purpose of which is to “provide[] a credible blueprint for the 
restoration of trust in LIBOR.”129  The report, among other things, summarizes Mr. 
Wheatley’s findings in a ten-point plan for a comprehensive reform of the 
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LIBOR.130  The plan focuses on creating a stronger regulatory regime to oversee 
the LIBOR, and institutional reform, which includes transferring responsibility for 
the LIBOR from the BBA to a new administrative body, the FCA.131  The report 
recommends waiting three months before publishing the LIBOR submissions in 
order to help prevent rate manipulation.132 The plan emphasizes the need for the 
new administration to create a code of conduct for rate submitters with specific 
guidelines requiring that submissions be corroborated by verifiable trade data and 
subject to formal approval.133  The report further recommends criminal penalties 
for bankers who break the law.134  Mr. Wheatley stopped short of urging banks to 
scrap the LIBOR, stating that getting rid of the LIBOR would cause damage to the 
many borrowers whose existing contracts rely on the LIBOR rate.135  
Regulators in the United States are equally interested in the future of the 
LIBOR.  Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC, has questioned the continued 
relative stability of the LIBOR to the European Parliament.136  “Despite a long and 
painful recovery, sometimes replacement is the better choice when a hip or a 
knee . . . or even a benchmark rate . . . has worn out,” Gensler said.137   
VI. CONCLUSION 
While it is too early to predict the LIBOR’s future, it is clear that big changes 
regarding the LIBOR’s regulation are in the offing: the system by which the 
LIBOR is set and governed will undoubtedly be overhauled, and regulators will be 
keeping a much closer eye on market manipulation for years to come.  
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